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Abstract. The paper examines whether intellectual property rights in art should be extended to the 
entire world. In earlier papers, the economics of patent rights have been examined and the argument 
made that world welfare is likely to fall if patent rights are extended to the entire world. This argument 
is recapitulated here with special attention to the assumptions that are needed for its validity. These 
assumptions are then reexamined in the context of markets for art to see whether the argument carries 
over. It is found that while most of the assumptions do carry over well enough to justify the argument, 
there are also certain circumstances that may require greater geographic extension of intellectual 
property rights in some cases. 
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1. Introduction 
In two papers,  Deardorf f  (1990, 1992), I have questioned the desirability of  extend- 
ing intellectual property (IP) rights to countries that currently do not have them. 
I have  argued, in the case of  patents and under  certain assumptions,  that such 
extension is harmful  to the countries where the new rights are introduced. More  
important,  I show that extension of  IP rights to all countries of  the world reduces 
world welfare,  in that these countries lose more than is gained by the other coun- 
tries whose  IP rights are being extended. Finally, I suggest  that the least developed 
countries ought  therefore to be exempted  f rom the provisions that have been nego- 
tiated in the Uruguay  Round of  the GATT to extend IP rights to all countries of  the 
world. In this paper  I examine whether  these arguments are applicable to another 
area of  IP protection: art. 
I will not undertake a formal  analysis here. That  could be obtained directly 
f rom Deardor f f  (1992) by  s imply changing the names and repeating the same 
equations and diagrams.  Rather, the question is whether the assumptions of  that 
analysis are as appropriate to artistic creations as they are to inventions subject to 
patents. I f  so, then the argument  of  that paper  carries over  to art; if  not, then the 
changed assumptions  may  be suggestive of  what alternative conclusions might  be 
appropriate.  
* Paper prepared for a conference on 'The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights', International 
Center for Art Economics, University of Venice, October 6-8, 1994. 
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In Section 2 of the paper I will review the argument from the previous papers, 
paying particular attention to the critical assumptions that were made and the roles 
that they play. In Section 3, I will speculate on how these critical assumptions 
may or may not match the reality of the world of art. Finally, in Section 4, I 
consider two additional characteristics of art that may also raise questions about 
the appropriateness of the kind of economic analysis that provides the basis for the 
rest of the paper. 
2. The Argument for Geographically Limited Intellectual Property 
Protection 
I begin by reviewing the argument for geographically limited IP protection in the 
case of patents. The framework is one in which certain economic agents devote 
their efforts and resources to inventing new products or processes. Once invented, 
at whatever cost, the processes can be used and the products produced repeatedly at 
some other cost, and other economic agents derive benefits from that production. 
Patents protect such inventions by granting the patent holder the exclusive right, 
within the jurisdiction of the patent, to produce the product (or use the process) 
and to license that production to others. As a result, the patent holder acquires the 
ability to act as a monopolist in the market for the product, charging a monopoly 
price and earning monopoly profit. The economic rationale for having patents rights 
at all is that this monopoly profit provides a return to inventive activity, without 
which many products that could be socially beneficial would not be invented. My 
argument for limited IP protection accepts this rationale, even though it acts in the 
direction of justifying more IP protection, not less. Thus the first assumption is that 
invention is responsive to profit, or more generally, 
ASSUMPTION 1. The creation of intellectual property is responsive to the finan- 
cial incentive for creating it. 
A patent is a very imperfect means of providing this incentive, however. On the 
one hand, for reasons familir from basic economic theory, it causes the consumer 
of the invented product to pay a monopoly price, higher than the marginal cost of 
producing the product, and therefore causes less of the product to be consumed 
than would be optimal. This is the standard 'dead weight loss' from monopoly 
pricing, and it will be positive whenever consumer demand responds at all to price. 
Thus we have 
ASSUMPTION 2. Consumer demand for the products of intellectual property 
is responsive to price. 
This means that even if a socially optimal number of inventions were created, their 
benefit to society would be suboptimal under a patent since consumers would be 
discouraged from consuming them by a price in excess of marginal cost. 
THE APPROPRIATE EXTENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ART 121 
On the other hand, while a patent causes a price that is too high from the 
standpoint of inducing optimal consumption, the monopoly price is also too low to 
induce an optimal amount of invention. For unless the patent holder can perfectly 
discriminate among demanders, charging a different price for each unit that is sold, 
there will be some units of the good sold at a price less than the benefit they create 
for consumers. The presence of this consumer surplus is beneficial to the con- 
sumers, but it also means that the monopoly profits are less than the total benefit of 
the invented good to society. Suppose that we think of the number of inventions as 
variable, with a whole spectrum of potential inventions existing that offer different 
costs and benefits to society. Then this fact - that patent holders, even with their 
monopolies over the market, do not secure for themselves the full social benefits 
from their innovations - will mean that some inventions whose social benefits 
would have exceeded their social costs will not be invented. Thus this conclusion 
that invention is suboptimal under a patent is based on two additional assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION 3. Holders of intellectual property rights cannot engage in perfect 
price discrimination. 
ASSUMPTION 4. There exists a wide range of potential intellectual property 
creations yielding a wide range of potential benefits to society. 
These assumptions together imply that, for a single country or jurisdiction, a system 
of patents to iprotect inventions will be desirable but not optimal. It is desirable, 
because without it nothing at all will be invented (assumption 1) and all social 
benefits will be lost. It is not optimal, however, for the reasons just described, since 
too little invention will take place and at the same time too little will be consumed 
of those products that are invented. Optimality in both dimensions would require 
that inventors somehow be given an incentive, at the margin, that is equal to the 
full social benefit from what they invent, and at the same time that consumers be 
charged prices equal only to the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the 
good once it is invented, and not including the cost of invention itself. It is possible 
to imagine a system of subsidies to invention, together with perfect competition 
in production, that might have these properties, but in practice it would never be 
possible to get the subsidies right. Therefore a patent system is a very useful second 
best mechanism. 
Now suppose that there are multiple jurisdictions, which I will call countries, 
though the argument does not require that. One could imagine circumstances in 
which it would be impossible or meaningless to have patents in one country but 
not another. Suppose there were no monitoring of borders, for example, and no 
transport costs, so that sellers from one country could sell freely in another. Then 
the granting of patent rights within only one country would confer no monopoly, 
since the patent holders would always be undercut by foreign competitors in all 
markets. In this case, the only meaningful alternatives are global patent protection 
or none at all, and as already noted the former clearly dominates the latter. Thus 
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to have an argument for limited patent protection I must have some separation of 
national markets: 
ASSUMPTION 5. Separate national intellectual property regimes are possible, 
in that the products of intellectual property can be kept out of a country if they do 
not conform to its rules regarding intellectual property rights. 
On the other hand, if intellectual property itself (the information, not the goods 
produced with that information) does not cross national borders readily, then the 
issue of extending IP rights may again reduce to a trivial choice between all or 
nothing. That is, suppose that it were impossible to copy an inventionfrom another 
country. Then countries without patent protection would either have no access to 
the invented products at all, or they would have to buy from the foreign patent 
holders even though they honor no patents themselves, because only the foreign 
patent holders would have the necessary know-how. Therefore, the issue of limited 
patent protection becomes interesting only if such information does diffuse readily, 
which I assume: 
ASSUMPTION 6. Once created, intellectual property is technologically capa- 
ble of being exploited freely throughout the world. 
Under these assumptions, if patent protection is provided in only one part of the 
world, then patent holders will charge monopoly prices and earn monopoly profits 
only within the countries that enforce that protection, while consumers in the rest 
of the world will have access to patented products at marginal cost from com- 
petitive suppliers. In that situation the extension of patent protection to a country 
that did not previously provide it does not give that country's consumers access to 
previously patented products, since they already had that access. Instead, there are 
three effects that arise from extending protection to a new country, one a transfer 
and the other two involving efficiency: 
1. A transfer from the new country's consumers to the holders of existing patents, 
as prices rise to monopoly levels for existing patented products that these 
consumers continue to buy. 
2. An efficiency loss borne by the new country's consumers as they reduce 
consumption of existing patented products when their prices rise. 
3. An efficiency gain to consumers in all countries as the increased profit to be 
had from any invention induces some previously unprofitable inventions to 
be undertaken. 
Note that effects 1 and 2 are both losses for the new country, with only effect 3 
being a gain, except to the extent that some holders of existing patents are residents 
of the new country. In my earlier work I have excluded that possibility, though that 
is not necessarily the case. 
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ASSUMPTION 7. Intellectual property rights are granted primarily to residents 
of the countries that implement intellectual property right regimes. 
This assumption matters only for the distributional consequences of an extension of 
IP rights, not for effects on world welfare. Under this assumption, the three effects 
above assure that extension of IP rights to a new country that is small compared to 
the part of the world already covered will lower the welfare of the new country. 
Similarly, the countries that start out with IP protection stand only to gain from 
its extension to other countries, since effects 1 and 3 above are beneficial to them, 
while effect 2 does not matter for them. Therefore, it is not surprising that early 
discussions of IP issues under the GATT were initiated by the developed countries 
that already had IP protection and were resisted by the developing countries that 
did not. The most obvious effects on these countries were for the former to gain 
and the latter to lose. 
To determine the effects on the world as a whole, one can ignore the transfer 
effect above and just compare the two opposing efficiency effects, 2 and 3. Exten- 
sion of 1P protection to new countries will be beneficial for the world as a whole 
if effect 3 is larger than effect 2; it will be harmful if not. This comparison in turn 
depends on the number of previously invented products whose prices will rise with 
IP extension in effect 2, v e r s u s  the number of new inventions that can be stimulted 
by IP extension in effect 3. The latter could surely be larger than the former if the 
initial scope of IP protection were very small, so that few or no existing inventions 
would have been present. In that case, extension of IP rights to more countries 
would be desirable. But if initial 1P protection already covers enough of the world 
to foster a large number of inventions, and if there is nothing special about the new 
country in terms of fostering new inventions, then the loss in effect 2 will be larger 
than the gain in effect 3 and the world will lose from IP extension. 
ASSUMPTION 8. Demands for the products of intellectual property are the 
same in all countries, depending identically in all countries on prices and incomes. 
The argument for stopping short of covering the whole world with patent protection 
is then as follows: As more and more countries are covered by patent systems, the 
number of existing patents grows and the efficiency loss from moving to monopoly 
pricing for the products of those patents in an additional country also grows. At the 
same time, inventors move further and further down the list of socially beneficial 
potential inventions as they get a larger share of the surplus, and the inventions 
that remain that could be induced by extension to an additional country are less 
desirable. These two effects together imply, for any but the most extreme con- 
figurations of the world, that at some point it becomes undesirable to extend IP 
protection still further. All of this is worked out more formally in Deardorff (1992) 
for linear functions relating demands to prices and the surplus from inventions to 
their costs. However, the logic of the argument is more general than that linear case 
and depends, as I have shown here, primarily on the assumptions listed above. 
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3. The Assumptions Applied to Art 
The world of art is large and diverse and I can not hope to capture it all here. Instead, 
I will pose a simple characterization of what the economics of art may entail and 
compare that against the assumptions list above. I leave a more informed analysis 
of particular types of art to others who might, if they are so inclined, structure their 
analysis too around these assumptions. 
For IP rights to be an issue for art, the artistic creation must be more than just 
a single non-reproducible object or event. If paintings could not be copied, for 
example, then only one person at a time could possess a painting and ownership of 
the artistic creation would be the same as ownership of the object itself. The artist 
could retain control of his or her creation or pass that control to another by selling 
the painting. 
A key feature of art for the present purpose is therefore the fact that it can be 
reproduced in some fashion. In many cases the reproduction may be imperfect 
and, therefore, less valuable than the original, but even a very imperfect copy can 
undermine the value of the original for the artist. And quite often, it is the copies, 
not the original, that are the normal mode of delivery. In music, for example, 
the original artistic creation may have been the studio-recording session or the 
electronically edited master tape, but it is the multiple copies of this, in the form of 
records, tapes, or compact discs, that deliver the creation to its audience. In the case 
of a painting, the original plays a more important role, of course, but prints made 
from the painting are also important modes of delivery. In these and other cases, 
because it is technologically possible to make a copy that has artistic value, it is 
equally possible for unauthorized copies to be made and to undermine the market 
for the original and for the legitimate copies. 
My characterization of art for the purpose of this paper is therefore something 
that is first created, then copied, with only the copies being sold on the market. 
The creation itself uses resources, including materials and the time of the artist. 
Copies also use resources, but much less per copy than the original creation, and 
do not require the time of the artist. On the supply side, therefore, art is very 
similar to inventions, suggesting that exploring the parallel between the two is not 
misguided. 
On the demand side, my discussion of patents said very little, except that 
products of inventions were subject to downward-sloping demand. That seems a 
harmless starting point for the (copied) art objects considered here, although I will 
speculate below on how special features of demand for art might enter the story. 
I turn now to a discussion of each of the assumptions from Section 2. I will ask 
whether any modifications of them might be appropriate in considering IP for art 
and, of so, whether these modifications might alter the conclusion that IP protection 
should be geographically limited. 
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ASSUMPTION 1. The creation of intellectual property is responsive to the finan- 
cial incentive for creating it. 
Do artists respond to money? The conception of the 'starving artist' suggests that 
they do not, and that artists are driven to create by some inner creative force that 
they cannot resist. If that were really true, then there might be no economic argu- 
ment for IP protection of art at all, since it wouldn't be needed. My argument that 
IP protection should be geographically limited would not be needed, since there 
would be no protection to limit. 
However, the starving artists aside, it seems clear that across the broad spectrum 
of artistic endeavor, a great many artists do respond to financial incentives, even if 
money provides only one of several motives for them to create. Even the starving 
artists will in fact respond to financial incentives, whether they wish to or not, if 
they starve to death and can no longer produce. Furthermore, most art requires 
some materials in addition to the artist's time, and financial constraints may limit 
the quantity and quality of an artist's creations. 
On the other hand, it is probably true for at least some forms of art that much 
would be produced even if the artists earned nothing at all. They would have to 
support themselves doing other things, and they could not therefore produce as 
much as they would otherwise, but there would be some minimal amount of art 
that would exist even without IP protection of any kind. If so, this matters for my 
argument of limiting IP protection by making it stronger. Assuming that there are 
diminishing social returns to art, like everything else, then the more art we would 
have without IP protection, the larger will be the effect 2 that was discussed above, 
and the smaller will be effect 3. The optimal extent of IP protection in art will 
therefore be reduced. 
ASSUMPTION 2. Consumer demand for the products of intellectual property 
is responsive to price. 
Downward sloping demand is such a pervasive assumption in economics that it 
may be unnecessary to question it here. Surely for most artistic creations it is 
valid, and we can move on. However, it does appear to some of us outside the art 
world that some art is purchased because of its high price, not in spite of it. To 
the extent that art lovers derive satisfaction in part from the high prices of the art 
that they own, either because of the status this confers or because of speculative 
expectations, artists could face a demand that rises with price, at least over some 
range. 
Such upward sloping demand would invalidate the conventional market analy- 
sis that underlies the argument of this paper. In particular, the main motivation for 
limiting IP protection, which was the losses to consumers from paying monopoly 
prices, would disappear if these prices raised the welfare of those who paid them. 
This possibility, if it were true in the world of art, could turn my analysis on its 
head. However, I do not believe that it is a valid concern for most art. 
126 ALAN V. DEARDORFF 
ASSUMPTION 3. Holders of intellectual property rights cannot engage in perfect 
price discrimination. 
If artists could charge every buyer a different price, then they could extract all of the 
surplus that their work generated, and they would be motivated to create an amount 
of art that would be optimal. Further, since they would then be willing even with 
IP protection to charge the marginal buyer marginal cost, there would also be no 
distortion of consumer demand for art. Under these circumstances, world-wide IP 
protection of art would be efficient. One might still want to limit it for distributional 
reasons - the artists and the countries in which they live would now get all of the 
benefits from artistic creation - but this seems much less of a concern here than for 
inventions. 
But while price discrimination may be feasible for non-reproducible art (you 
can charge what the market will bear for every painting, for example), it is surely 
not possible for the copies that are of concern here. The amount of price discrimi- 
nation that is possible, through alternative packaging and labelling for example, is 
very limited. 
ASSUMPTION 4. There exists a wide range of potenital intellectual property 
creations yielding a wide range of potential benefits to society. 
The importance of this assumption for art is that it assures that there will exist some 
artistic creations that are not produced under the current level of IP protection that 
will be produced if protection is extended. If all possible art were far from the 
margin, all existing art being viable even with a lower return and all non-existing 
art remaining unviable even with a higher return, then the only efficiency gain to 
extending IP protection would disappear. It would be optimal to reduce IP protec- 
tion, and thus increase consumer welfare, until one reached the point where price 
would matter after all for supply. 
This may in fact be plausible for some types of art where the talent to produce it 
is very scarce and very distinct. If humanity only gives birth to a small handful of 
individuals who could possibly perform as opera tenors, for example, and if these 
are so scarce that they are fully employed at well above their opportunity cost, then 
a reduction in the scope for IP protection of their music would not cause them to 
sing any less and would give more of the world access to their performances. 
However, this is an extreme example that is probably not valid even for tenors, 
and in most artistic endeavors there does seem to be a wide range of talents available. 
ASSUMPTION 5. Separate national intellectual property regimes are possible, 
in that the products of intellectual property can be kept out of a country if they do 
not conform to its rules regarding intellectual property rights. 
This assumption is obvously not entirely valid for all forms of art. Anyone who 
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has purchased a pirated compact disc in another counto, and smuggled it home in 
their luggage can testify to the porousness of our borders. If this sort of arbitrage 
worked perfectly, then any system of IP protection in art that encompassed less 
than the whole world would provide no protection at all. 
However, such arbitrage does not work perfectly, as is evidenced by the tremen- 
dous price differences that continue to exist between countries with and without 
IP protection. Thus, while the case of the smuggled CD indicates that borders are 
porous, the well-known price differences that motivate that smuggling indicate 
that sufficient barriers do exist for my argument to go through. As long as such 
price differences exist, then so will the efficiency loss of extending IP protection 
as described above. 
ASSUMPTION 6. Once created, intellectual property is technologically capa- 
ble of being exploited freely throughout the world. 
As already discussed, it is only art that is or can be copied that poses problems 
of intellectual property protection. One could imagine, however, that for certain 
kinds of art the technology of copying might be confined to the country where the 
art originated, or that potential foreign copiers might be unable to gain access to 
the original. In such a case, without extension of IP protection, this art would be 
completely unavailable to foreign consumers and extending IP protection could 
only make them better off. Thus this assumption really is critical to the case for 
geographic limitation. 
However, while I can imagine forms of art for which this would be true, I am 
not aware of any actual examples of it. Certainly, most of the art for which IP 
protection is discussed does satisfy assumption 6, and one would be surprised, in 
view of the rapid international diffusion of technology, if that were not the case. 
ASSUMPTION 7. Intellectual property rights are granted primarily to residents 
of the countries that implement intellectual property right regimes. 
Extension of IP protection in art causes a transfer from consumers of previously 
unprotected art to those who possess the property rights. These beneficiaries are 
presumably, in most cases, the artists. If these artists are located in the country where 
IP protection previously was enforced, then as stated in effect 1 above, this transfer 
is from countries without IP protection to countries with IP protection. However, 
regimes of IP protection typically grant it to whomever the regime determines to be 
the rightful owner of the property, regardless of nationality. Suppose, for example, 
that Taiwan did not protect rights to music but that a Taiwanese recording artist 
were to become popular on the world market. The artist would undoubtedly secure 
rights to his or her music in the U.S., Europe, etc., even though protection would 
be unavailable in Taiwan. In that case, the extension of IP protection to Taiwan 
would cause a transfer from Taiwanese consumers to the Taiwanese artist, and a 
portion of effect 1 would not occur internationally. 
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Realistically, systems of IP protection are typically taken advantage of more 
by domestic residents that by foreigners, even though such protection is legally 
available to all who might request it. The reason is probably partly a matter of 
information, and partly that the products that need protection are usually first sold 
on the producer's domestic market. Therefore I would not expect in the case of art 
that effect 1 would be seriously undermined in most cases. 
On the other hand, as time passes and national capabilities change, one might 
easily find new groups of artists emerging in countries where there previously were 
few. These artists, as the potential beneficiaries of IP protection, may press for its 
adoption. I am told that the ultimate acceptance of IP protection in the Uruguay 
Round by developing countries who opposed it early in the negotiations was in part 
due to their realization that their own producers of IP were becoming significant in 
world markets. 
ASSUMPTION 8. Demands for the products of intellectual property are the 
same in all countries, depending identically in all countries on prices and incomes. 
This is perhaps the most critical and also the most questionable assumption of 
the analysis. To see why, suppose the opposite extreme case of consumers that, 
in each country, demand things that are different from those that are demanded 
by consumers in all other countries. In the case of art, suppose that each country 
has its own national artistic style, with no appreciation whatsoever for the styles 
of other countries. In such a case, IP protection is needed within a country before 
its art will be produced anywhere, for there would be no market for it elsewhere. 
Effects 1 and 2 of the above analysis disappear, because consumers would have 
had no interest in another country's art and would not have wanted copies of it 
even at marginal cost. Further, effect 3 would be correspondingly large, since 1P 
protection in the new country would make all of that country's art viable where 
none of it was before. 
This extreme case suggests also a more plausible middle ground where the case 
for limited IP protection may not be as strong as I have argued. To the extent that 
every country expresses its own national culture through its art, then even though 
consumers everywhere may enjoy the same wide variety of artistic expressions, 
they will also favor them in different proportions. A country that does not provide 
IP protection to art will put its own artists at a disadvantage, for they would not 
have as good a market with the consumers in other countries where IP protection 
is provided. As a result, the indigenous domestic art will not prosper as it would if 
IP protection were available at home. 
One sometimes hears complaints that international trade is a negative force, 
undermining the cultural identities of countries who become homogenized into 
consumers of the same goods that are consumed in every other country. If such 
homogenization takes place because in fact the consumers of the world are largely 
identical, then it is not necessarily to be regretted. But it is also possible that con- 
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sumers do have distinctive national preferences but are prevented from exercising 
them because a lack of IP protection saps the incentive for local producers and 
artists to cater to those preferences. In such cases extension of IP protection is 
clearly desirable. 
4. Other  Considerations 
This brief review of the assumptions underlying the argument for geographic 
limitation on IP protection suggests that in most cases the argument does carry over 
from patents to art. In most cases, the assumptions appear either to be appropriate 
or to be violated in ways that only improve the case for limiting protection. The one 
exception is that just considered, of distinctive national preferences for types of art 
that would not be created elsewhere. It is in the interest of countries themselves, 
without pressure from other countries, to provide IP protection to artists who cater 
to those distinctive preferences. 
In this concluding Section, I depart from the framework of the earlier argument 
and its assumptions to consider additional characteristics of art that are not well 
captured in that framework and that may have their own implications for the 
appropriate extent of IP protection. 
4.1 .  SCARCITY VALUE 
It is commonplace that scarcity enhances value, but for ordinary goods the reason 
is only that scarce supplies are allocated to those consumers who place the highest 
marginal value on them and are, therefore, willing to pay the highest price. For 
some forms of art, however, it appears that scarcity confers a value that is even 
greater than this. Many owners of paintings, for example, seem to value them not 
only for their esthetic beauty and the other pleasures that they provide to onlookers, 
but also for the fact that few others have similar versions of the same item. Knowing 
this, artists who deal in reproduced forms of their own work (prints, lithographs, 
etc.) make a point of numbering the copies and stating and limiting their total 
number. This practice makes sense only if the artists believe that their works are 
being valued in part for their scarcity. 
If this is the case, then it adds substantially to the case for providing IP protection 
in art. The failure to do so undermines the artist's ability to limit supply, and this not 
only undermines the artist's monopoly power over price. It also lowers the value 
of the work to those consumers who derive satisfaction from its scarcity. Avoiding 
this outcome is therefore an additional benefit to extending IP protection, and also 
one that suggests the need to extend it to the entire world. 
Of course not all art has this property that its value is enhanced by scarcity. On 
the contrary, much popular art seems to thrive on ubiquity, the demand picking up 
only when the artist or art form has become fashionable. In these cases it may be 
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in the artist's own interest, up to a point, to permit copying of the work in order to 
get it into the public view. 
4.2. ART AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
The best of art serves a greater purpose than the mere satisfaction of those individ- 
uals who happen to purchase it. Great art elevates the human spirit in a way that 
often transcends individuals and enriches all humanity. Also, just as the art that 
an individual chooses for personal display helps to define that individual, the art 
that a country's artists create defines the culture of that country. All of this means 
that the benefits from artistic creation extend well beyond the artist and the artist's 
customers. Art is a public good at the same time that it is a private good. 
As with any public good, art is therefore under-provided by the private market. 
This is recognized throughout the world as governments routinely provide some 
subsidies to artistic creation, and various other means are also available, through 
non-profit organizations and other benefactors, to assist artists beyond the incen- 
tives that the private market provides. Still, subsidies to artistic endeavors are an 
imperfect means of providing the public good in this case, because it is difficult 
for such subsidies to be calibrated to the quality of the artistic product that results. 
It is easy for a system of subsidies to art to become subsidies only for the pretense 
of art, encouraging entrepreneurs rather than artists. 
Therefore, there is an extra payoffto any mechanism that can further encourage 
art through the market. As we have seen, intellectual property rights are an imper- 
fect means of fostering artistic creation, since they necessarily include a tradeoff 
between an adequate incentive for artists to create art, on the one hand, and the 
incentive for consumers of art to consume it, on the other. To the extent that art 
is a public good, this should tilt the optimal balance further toward the artists, 
and suggests an optimal IP regime that gives a greater share of the surplus to the 
artists than otherwise.Thus, this last consideration suggests a reason for further 
geographic extension of IP protection in art. 
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